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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of involuntary delisting rate for
the Egyptian initial public offerings (IPOs) issued over the period 1992-2009.
Design/methodology/approach – A definition of survival time that considers the date when the
new Egyptian listing rules were enforced to track delisting status for each IPO firm for five survival
years is relied on. Binary logit regression analysis is used to identify these determinants. Total sample
is divided into two subsamples: the first subsample covers the period from 1992 to 2004. It is used to
estimate the logit equations and to predict delisting status of firms included in the second subsample,
which covers the period from 2005 to 2009.
Findings – The probability of involuntary delisting decreases significantly with the increase in firm
size, institutional ownership, assets growth rate, operating efficiency, offering size, initial returns and
insider ownership. However, it increases significantly in IPO firms with high financial leverage. Based
on the estimated logit regression equations, the status of the six firms included in the second subsample
are correctly predicted.
Practical implications – The results provide several implications for investors, issuing firms and
setters of listing rules.
Originality/value – This study uses new variables, such as firm type, institutional ownership and
listing variables. In addition, several theories are tested and supported.
Keywords Initial public offerings (IPOs), Egypt, Binary logit analysis, Delisting rate, Involuntary
delisting
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Initial public offering (IPO) is one of the most significant events in a firm’s history, as it
not only requires the IPO firms to undergo some structural modifications, such as
changes in personnel policies and operating processes before going public, but also
exposes the IPO firms to the risk of being acquired, merged or delisted involuntarily
from the stock exchange. The failure to adapt to the new business environment has been
argued as being one of the factors causing deterioration of the firm’s survival profile,
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which leads to involuntary delisting (Jain and Kini, 2000; Khurshed, 2000). Nonetheless,
previous empirical studies (Baker and Kennedy, 2002; Demers and Joos, 2007; Yung
et al., 2008) have shown that the probability of IPO involuntary delisting is significantly
influenced by the IPO firms’ business and financial positions (such as size and leverage)
at the time of listing.
The adverse effect of involuntary delisting on shareholders’ wealth indicates that
this is a crucial economic issue, especially in the case of Egypt, where the number of
involuntary delisting cases taking place after the issuance of the new Egyptian listing
rules on August 2002 is quite large. Twenty-six per cent of Egyptian IPO firms have
been delisted involuntarily over the period of 2002-2009.
Few studies, however, can be found on the determinants of IPO delisting in the
Middle East and North African region in general, given that most prior related studies
have been executed in the American context. A few studies have been undertaken on the
Egyptian IPO market, such as Hegazy (1997, 2001) and Omran (2005). They examine the
initial and long-term returns of the Egyptian privatization IPOs and their determinants.
In other words, these studies focus on the returns perspective of IPOs and ignore their
risk perspective. Our study, however, focuses on the risk perspective of the Egyptian
IPOs. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine involuntary
delisting rate in Egypt.
Findings from such studies are beneficial for assessing the Egyptian IPO firms’
readiness to go public and for forecasting IPO involuntary delisting, to control and
reduce involuntary delisting occurrences. Such studies, which rely on information from
IPO prospectuses (the legal document that ensures all important information is
available to the prospective investors), also allow us to evaluate the relevance of the
information contained in the prospectuses to predict the delisting status of IPO firms.
We thus use logit regression analysis to examine the influence of firm characteristics,
offering, signaling and listing variables on the probability of involuntary delisting
based on the data of 163 IPOs issued in the Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX) from 1992
to 2009. A definition of survival time derived from the Egyptian context is used to track
the delisting status of each IPO firm for five survival years. We find that firm size,
ownership structure, financial leverage, asset growth rate, operating efficiency, offering
size and initial returns variables are significant determinants of the probability of
involuntary delisting.
We contribute to the existing literature on delisting rate by testing a comprehensive
set of potential predictors for IPO involuntary delisting rate; some of them are new, such
as firm type, institutional ownership and listing variables. In addition, several related
theories are tested in this study, namely, agency cost, signaling, marketing events,
efficient monitoring, resource-based and trade-off theories. Finally, the concept of
marginal effects and likelihood ratio statistics are applied in delineating the results of
the study.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an overview
of the EGX. In Section 3, we review the theoretical and empirical literature on the
determinants of involuntary delisting rate. Section 4 is dedicated to data and research
design, which begins with the sampling procedure, followed by the measurement of
variables included in the study and ends with a discussion of the logit model. The results










































The EGX, formerly known as the Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchanges, is one of
the oldest stock exchanges in the world and includes two exchanges, namely, the
Alexandria Stock Exchange and the Cairo Stock Exchange, established in 1883 and
1903, respectively. Although the two exchanges competed with each other since
their establishment, they have now been integrated into the EGX (Mecagni and
Sourial, 1999).
The EGX was very active in the 1940s, being the fifth most active stock exchange in
the world during that period. However, the central planning and the socialist policies
adopted by the Egyptian Government led to a major nationalization program that
started in 1959. Consequently, the stock market remained dormant until the beginning
of the 1990s. The issuance of the Privatization Law No. 203/1991 and the Capital Market
Law No. 95/1992 resulted in the reactivation of the capital market through private
investment support and increased investors’ protection (Abdel Shahid, 2001; Bolbol
et al., 2005).
Firms can be listed on either the official schedule or on the unofficial schedule. The
requirements of listing on the official schedule are more stringent than those required for
listing on the unofficial one. The EGX listing rules were updated and implemented in
August 2002, for firms listed on or after that date. In addition, these new rules were
implemented in September 2003, after a one-year grace period for firms listed before
August 2002. The new listing rules are more strict than the old rules. These new rules
allowed the involuntary delisting of bad firms, and segmented the official schedule into
two. The larger firms were moved under the official schedule, and smaller firms under
the unofficial schedule. Three criteria were added to the listing requirements:
(1) minimum ratio of net profit before taxes to issued capital;
(2) minimum share capital; and
(3) minimum number of issued shares (Berg and Mierta, 2004).
Based on delisting cases detailed under the 123/2008 law, involuntary delisting in the
EGX may take place if:
• listing is made based on false information that affects the validity of listing;
• the firm does not comply with disclosure rules after one month of receiving a
notification from the EGX;
• there is no trading on the firm’s shares for six consecutive months;
• the firm does not pay the listing fees; and
• the firm violates one of the listing rules and regulations (The Egyptian Exchange
year book, 2008).
3. Literature review on the determinants of involuntary delisting rate
In this section, we present the theoretical and empirical evidence on the determinants of
involuntary delisting by variables. The determinants are classified into four groups,
namely, firm characteristics, offering, signaling and listing variables. The expected









































Firm’s age, firm size, firm type, liquidity, growth rate in assets, cash coverage, operating
performance, institutional ownership, venture capitalist (VC) backing and financial
leverage are the firm characteristics identified as potential determinants of delisting rate
in Egypt. The resource-based theory, developed by Wernerfelt (1984) and Barney (1991),
claims that the ability of a firm to develop and sustain unique resources affects its
competitive advantage and its performance, accordingly. Esteve-Pérez and
Mañez-Castillejo (2008) use this theory to identify the determinants of a firm’s survival.
According to them, older and larger firms and those with high operating performance
are expected to have enough resources for long survival compared to other firms.
Therefore, firm’s age, firm size and operating performance[1] variables are expected to
have negative relationships with delisting rate.
The negative relationship between firm’s age and the involuntary delisting rate is
confirmed empirically by Schultz (1993), Peristiani and Hong (2004), Li et al. (2006),
Demers and Joos (2007) and Yung et al. (2008). In addition, Schultz (1993), Baker and
Kennedy (2002), Bhabra and Pettway (2003), Peristiani (2003), Li et al. (2006), Charitou
et al. (2007), Demers and Joos (2007) and Yung et al. (2008) find support for the negative
relationship between firm size and delisting rate. Furthermore, the negative relationship
between profitability and delisting rate is supported by Jain and Kini (1999b), Baker and
Kennedy (2002), Willenborg and McKeown (2001), Wilbon (2002), Bhabra and Pettway
(2003), Peristiani and Hong (2004) and Charitou et al. (2007).
By the same token, privatized firms and those with high ratios of liquidity, assets
growth rate and cash coverage are expected to have less delisting rate because they
usually have more unique resources compared to other firms. Willenborg and McKeown
(2001) and Peristiani (2003), among others, support the negative relationship between
liquidity and involuntary delisting rate. In addition, Platt (1995) finds that the delisting
rate increases significantly with the increase in the inventory to cash flow ratio and the
interest expense to cash ratio.
The monitoring role of institutional investors may improve corporate governance
mechanisms and ameliorate firm performance, accordingly (Balatbat et al., 2004). This
argument is in accordance with the efficient monitoring hypothesis of Pound (1988). The
empirical studies of Sun and Tong (2002) and Balatbat et al. (2004), among others,
support the positive relationship between institutional ownership and IPOs’ operating
performance. On the other hand, institutional investors may not monitor managements’
actions effectively, due to the mutually advantageous relationships with managers, as
stated by the conflict of interest and strategic alignment hypotheses of Pound (1988).
Therefore, the relationship between institutional ownership retention and the
probability of involuntary delisting is ambiguous.
Based on the certification/monitoring hypothesis, the involvement of VCs in the IPO
process certifies that the offer price reflects all relevant information. VCs also have
monitoring and advising roles in their firms after the offering date. They can easily
attract reputable underwriters, institutional investors and analysts to guarantee the
success of their firms in the IPO process (Jain and Kini, 1995, 2000; Jain et al., 2008).
Therefore, VC-backed firms are expected to have less delisting rate relative to non-VC
backed firms. The empirical evidence of Li et al. (2006), Kooli and Meknassi (2007) and








































The trade-off theory of capital structure argues that financial leverage is expected to
have a positive relationship with financial distress and the probability of involuntary
delisting accordingly (Lamberto and Rath, 2010). This positive relationship is confirmed
by several authors (Platt, 1995; Baker and Kennedy, 2002; Li et al., 2006; Demers and
Joos, 2007; Yung et al., 2008).
3.2 Offering variables
There is support from literature that offering variables, namely, offering size and IPO
activity, also contribute to an IPO firm being involuntarily delisted. Based on the
perspective of the resource-based theory, firms with higher offering size are expected to
survive longer because they are expected to have the required resources for innovation
and advertising activities. Jain and Kini (1999b), Willenborg and McKeown (2001),
Bhabra and Pettway (2003), Boubakri et al. (2005) and Kooli and Meknassi (2007) find a
significant negative relationship between offering size and delisting rate.
An IPO is issued either in hot- or cold-issue periods. Hot-issue periods are the periods
within which large numbers of IPOs are issued. Consequently, investors’ overoptimism
exists in hot-issue periods. The “window of opportunity hypothesis” of Ritter (1984,
1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) claims that many poor-performing firms enter the
IPO market in hot-issue periods to benefit from investors’ overoptimism. Consequently,
IPO firms that go public during hot periods are expected to have a high magnitude of
involuntary delisting rate. The expected positive relationship between IPO activity and
the delisting rate is supported by Boubakri et al. (2005), Demers and Joos (2007), Kooli
and Meknassi (2007) and Yung et al. (2008).
3.3 Signaling variables
The possibility of a firm becoming involuntarily delisted may also be influenced by the
signal conveyed to investors regarding the IPO firms’ quality at the time of listing.
Literature shows that these signals are reflected in the quality of auditors, initial returns
and insider ownership variables. Based on the signaling hypothesis of Jain and Martin
(2005), high-quality firms are expected to hire high-quality auditors to signal their
quality. It is not rational for low-quality firms to emulate the high-quality firms in
assigning high-quality auditors, because this will bring them under the severe
monitoring of reputable auditors. This will prohibit them from using earnings
management to increase investors’ valuation regarding their offerings. In addition, most
low-quality firms cannot bear the high costs of hiring high-quality auditors. Demers and
Joos (2007) report a significant lower delisting rate in high-tech firms that employ
high-quality auditors. Jain and Martin (2005) also find that auditor’s quality enhances
the survival profile of IPO firms.
Based on the theoretical explanations of the signaling hypothesis of Allen and
Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989), underpricing is
considered a signal of the firm’s quality. It can also be considered as a means for the
firm’s publicity according to the marketing event hypothesis of Chemmanur (1993) and
Demers and Lewellen (2003). The studies of Schultz (1993), Peristiani (2003), Boubakri
et al. (2005), Demers and Joos (2007) and Yung et al. (2008) find that the delisting rate








































The signaling hypothesis of Leland and Pyle (1977) and Grinblatt and Hwang (1989)
suggests that insider ownership provides a positive signal of the firm’s quality. Thus,
higher insider ownership retention should be associated with a lower delisting rate. In
addition, Jensen and Meckling (1976), in their interest convergence theory, argue that
agency costs will fall with high percentage of insider ownership. Peristiani and Hong
(2004) find significant support for the negative relationship between insider ownership
and involuntary delisting rate.
3.4 Listing variables
In the context of Egypt, listing rules and listing schedule variables are the variables
proposed as influencing the possibility of an IPO firm being forced into delisting. The
new Egyptian listing rules issued in August 2002 resulted in the real involuntary
delisting of bad firms. The Egyptian Capital Market Law No. 95/1992 encouraged good
firms to go public through IPOs. Thus, good IPOs were concentrated shortly after the
year 1992, and especially over the period from 1994 to 1999. The Egyptian privatization
program was also intense during these hot periods (Ministry of Investment, Ministry of
Trade and Industry, monthly economic bulletin, March 2005). Because privatized firms
are expected to have better performance compared to other firms, as argued earlier, the
probability of involuntary delisting is expected to be lower in firms listed before August
2002, compared to firms listed on or after that date.
In general, the official schedule is dedicated to larger and older firms, and the
unofficial schedule is suitable for small and young firms. The long-run performance is
expected to be better in large and old firms because they usually have the required
resources to improve their performance and to lengthen their survival time, as
hypothesized by the resource-based theory. Therefore, firms listed on the official
schedule are expected to have a lower involuntary delisting rate relative to those listed
on the unofficial schedule.
4. Data description and research design
4.1 Sampling procedure
Our initial sample includes 352 Egyptian IPO firms that were issued from January 1992
to December 2009 in the EGX. The year of 1992 is chosen as a starting year because the
Egyptian Capital Market Law No. 95 was issued in that year. This law is the primary
factor leading to the reemergence of the Egyptian Capital Market. In addition, December
2009 is chosen as the ending point because data were available to the researchers until
that date. The remaining number, after excluding financial firms as well as merger and
acquisition firms, is 293 IPO firms. This includes 76 involuntarily delisted firms.
However, 98 IPO firms of the 293 firms are excluded from the analysis due to
the unavailability of their prospectuses and/or their financial reports. Therefore, the
remaining 195 IPO firms are valid candidates included in the sample. Because the
observation period used in this study is five years, the analysis was stopped on 31
December 2004, leading to the exclusion of 26 IPO firms that still survived after 31
December 2004. Our final sample size includes 169 IPO firms; including 50 involuntarily
delisted firms.
The total sample of 169 IPO firms is divided into two subsamples. The first
subsample contains 163 IPO firms over the period 1992-2004, including 44 involuntarily








































previous subsample. These equations are used to predict delisting status of firms
included in the second subsample. The second subsample covers the period from 2005 to
2009. It includes six IPO firms; all of them were involuntarily delisted during the
five-year observation period. We did not split the total sample into two equal periods, so
as to have sufficient sample size when estimating the parameters of logit regression
model.
Financial firms are excluded from the analysis because their financial statements
have a special structure and their accounting practices are subject to special
regulations (Jaskiewicz et al., 2005). Furthermore, this exclusion is consistent with
several authors in their studies to investigate firm performance (Jain and Kini, 1995,
1999b; Bhabra and Pettway, 2003; Jain and Martin, 2005; Jaskiewicz et al., 2005;
Demers and Joos, 2007; Goot et al., 2009). Merger and acquisition firms are excluded
due to the great debate with regard to including them in the non-survival group
(Yung et al., 2008).
The previous statistics are mainly obtained from the EGX and its publications (such
as the daily and monthly EGX bulletins; the daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly and
yearly EGX reports; and the EGX yearbooks). In addition, IPO prospectuses are the
main source of data for many variables, obtained from the newspapers and the Capital
Market Authority. Other data are collected from DataStream Database, Osiris Database,
Kompass Egypt financial yearbook, Egypt information and dissemination company,
firms’ annual reports and their Web sites.
4.2 Measurement of variables
4.2.1 Measurement of the dependent variable (delisting rate). Following several authors
(Willenborg and McKeown, 2001; Bhabra and Pettway, 2003; Charitou et al., 2007;
Demers and Joos, 2007; Yung et al., 2008), we measure involuntary delisting rate by a
dummy variable having a value of “1” if the firm was delisted within three or five years’
survival time, and “0” otherwise. However, the definition of survival time used in this
paper is the date when the new Egyptian listing rules were enforced. These new rules,
which allowed the real involuntary delisting of bad firms, were applied in August 2002
for all firms listed from that date onward. They were also applied in September 2003 on
firms listed before August 2002. Thus, the survival time is calculated for firms listed
August 2002 onward as the listing period. It is computed, however, for firms listed
before August 2002, as the difference between the involuntary delisting date and
September 2003[2].
4.2.2 Measurement of the independent variables. Table I shows the measurement of
independent variables examined in this study and their expected relationship with the
involuntary delisting rate. The firm performance category includes financial leverage,
current ratio, assets growth rate, cash coverage ratio, assets turnover and profitability
(ROE) variables. The median of each individual variable in this category is calculated
over a three-year period before going public or over the period from the firm’s
incorporation into the offering date, whichever period is less. This period is chosen
because Article 5 of the Egyptian Capital Market Law No. 95/1992 mandates IPO firms










































of variables used and their
expected relationship with
involuntary delisting rate
Variable Measurement Expected relationship
Panel A: firm variables
Firm’s age (FIRMAGE) Number of months from incorporation to
the offering date
Negative
Firm size Ln (real market capitalization) 
Ln [market capitalization/consumer price
index (CPI)]
Negative
(FIRMSZ) Where market capitalization  number
of shares listed  closing price on the
first trading day
Firm type (FRMTYPE) A dummy variable having a value of “1”
if the firm is a privatized firm and “0” if





Percentage of shares held by institutions
to the total number of common shares





A dummy variable with a value of “1” if
the issue has a venture-capitalist backing




Total debts ratio  (total liabilities/total
assets) (the median over three-year
period before going public)
Positive
Liquidity (CURRENT) Current ratio  (current assets/current
liabilities) (the median over three-year




The arithmetic annual growth of firm’s
assets (the average over three-year




Cash coverage ratio  (EBIT 
depreciation) interest payments (the





Total assets turnover ratio  total sales/
total assets (the median over three-year
period before going public)
Negative
Profitability (ROE) Return on equity  net income to
shareholders’ equity (the median over
three-year period before going public)
Negative
Panel B: offering variables
Offering size
(OFFERSZ)
Ln (real gross proceeds)  Ln (gross
proceeds/CPI) where gross proceeds 
number of shares offered  offer price
Negative
IPO activity [hot or cold]
(ACTIVITY)
A dummy variable with a value of “1”
for hot-issue years (i.e. 1994, 1995, 1996,











































from the date of the firm’s incorporation, whichever period is less. In addition, using the
median is preferred to the mean and to yearly data because it eliminates the impact of
temporal fluctuations attributed to either accrual accounting or due to earning
management (Jain and Kini, 1999a).
4.3 Binary logit regression model
The logit model is used to examine the determinants of involuntary delisting rate[3]. The
involuntary delisting rate (Pi) is estimated based on the logit model using the following
equation (Schultz, 1993; Wooldridge, 2006; Brooks, 2008):
Pi  exp b0  
k1
n









exp  the exponential under the logit model.
b0  the intercept of the model.
Table I.
Variable Measurement Expected relationship
Panel C: signaling variables
Quality of auditor
(QLAUDIT)
A dummy variable with a value of “1” if
the auditor is designated as high quality
and “0” otherwise; where high-quality
auditors are the following big auditors:
“Hazem Hassan – KPMG”, “Saleh,
Barsoum, Abdel Aziz & Co – Deloitte &
Touche”, “Emad Ragheb – Ernst &
Young”, “Price Waterhouse”, “Coopers &




Initial return (INITIAL) The percentage return from offer price to




Alpha  percentage of ownership
retained by managers and substantial
shareholders to the total number of
shares after the offering
Negative
Panel D: listing variables
Listing rules (RULES) A dummy variable with a value of “1” if
firm is listed August 2002 onward and
“0” otherwise





A dummy variable with a value of “1” if
firm is listed on the official schedule and
“0” otherwise (on the listing date)









































n  number of independent variables.
Xk, i  the regressor number “k” of firm “i”.
bk  parameter number “k”.
5. Empirical results
5.1 Descriptive analysis
Tables II and III present the descriptive statistics related to the categorical and
continuous variables of the 163 IPO firms used in the five-year delisting rate analysis,
respectively. Table II shows that delisting rate is greater in the unofficial schedule than
in the official one. More specifically, 43 per cent of the IPO firms listed on the unofficial
schedule are delisted involuntarily within the five-year survival time. However, only 8
per cent of the IPO firms listed on the official schedule are delisted within the same
period. In addition, the percentages of firms delisted involuntarily within the five-year
survival time are 55 per cent and 25 per cent for IPOs issued in cold and hot periods,
respectively. Thus, the delisting rate appears greater in cold periods than in hot ones.
Moreover, IPO firms audited by reputable auditors have lower delisting rates than those
audited by non-reputable auditors. Essentially, 37 per cent of the IPO firms audited by
non-reputable auditors are delisted involuntarily within the five-year survival time.
However, only 10 per cent of the IPO firms audited by non-reputable auditors are
delisted within this period.
It is also evident from Table II that VC participation decreases the probability of
involuntary delisting. Specifically, the delisting rate is 10 per cent in firms backed by
VCs and 33 per cent in non-VC backed firms. Most IPO firms (154 firms) are listed before
August 2002. In addition, the delisting rate increases when firms are listed August 2002
Table II.
Cross-tabulation of
delisting status of sample
firms based on five years’
survival time
Variables (n  163 firms) Survived n (per cent) Delisted n (per cent) Total n (per cent)
Listing schedule
Official 68 (92) 6 (8) 74 (100)
Unofficial 51 (57) 38 (43) 89 (100)
IPO activity
Cold period 5 (45) 6 (55) 11 (100)
Hot period 114 (75) 38 (25) 152 (100)
Quality of auditor
Low 64 (63) 38 (37) 102 (100)
High 55 (90) 6 (10) 61 (100)
Venture capital backing
No 83 (67) 40 (33) 123 (100)
Yes 36 (90) 4 (10) 40 (100)
Listing rules
Listed before August 2002 116 (75) 38 (25) 154 (100)
Listed August 2002 onward 3 (33) 6 (67) 9 (100)
Firm type
Private 60 (62) 37 (38) 97 (100)








































onward compared to the scenario before that date (67 per cent vs 25 per cent). Finally, the
delisting rate is higher in private IPOs (38 per cent) compared to that in privatized IPOs
(11 per cent).
Table III illustrates that the mean (median) of firm’s age from incorporation to the
offering date for the 163 IPO firms is 303.43 (240) months, with the standard
deviation equaling 255.34 months. On the first trading day, the mean (median) value
of firm size measured by market capitalization, adjusted by the consumer price
index (CPI), is 11.90 (1.34) million Egyptian pounds. Firm size ranges from 127
million Egyptian pounds to 282.37 million Egyptian pounds. In addition, the mean
(median) value of institutional ownership approximately equals 57 per cent (66 per
cent). However, the mean and median values of financial leverage are 66.85 and 71.54
per cent, respectively. Additionally, current ratio variable has a mean (median)
value of 1.41 (1.09). Although the mean growth rate in total assets is 15.33 per cent,
the median value only equals 6.83 per cent. The mean (median) cash coverage value
is 32.94 (9.76); the minimum cash coverage value is 1.79; and the maximum value
is 242.5.
In addition, the lowest and highest values of assets turnover are nearly 0 and 5.97,
respectively, with the mean (median) value approximately equal to 1.12 (0.78). The
minimum and maximum values of ROE are 54.5 and 65.12 per cent, respectively,
with mean and median values nearly equal to 20 and 17 per cent, respectively.
Furthermore, the mean value of the offering size adjusted by the CPI at the offering
date is 4.60 million Egyptian pounds. The lowest and highest offering sizes are 131
million Egyptian pounds and 113.93 million Egyptian pounds, respectively. The
initial returns variable has a mean (median) value of 24.02 per cent (16.2 per cent).
Finally, the average value of insider ownership retention is nearly 55 per cent, and
the lowest and highest insider ownerships are 5 and 97.2 per cent, respectively.
5.2 Estimating the binary logit regression model[4]
It is not recommended to build a logit model that includes all variables examined in
this study due to the multicollinearity problem. More specifically, firm size and






Variable (n  163 firms) Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Firm’s age (in months) 303.43 240.00 255.34 3.00 1211.00
Firm size (in million EGP) 11.90 1.49 32.74 0.00 282.37
Institutional ownership (in per cent) 57.43 65.80 27.53 2.00 97.30
Financial leverage (in per cent) 66.85 71.54 17.20 16.34 96.80
Current ratio (times) 1.41 1.09 1.10 0.03 6.62
Asset growth (in per cent) 15.33 6.83 23.59 37.82 116.35
Cash coverage (times) 32.94 9.76 45.83 1.79 242.50
Assets turnover (times) 1.12 0.78 1.04 0.00 5.97
ROE (in per cent) 20.70 17.22 18.00 54.50 65.12
Offering size (in million EGP) 4.60 0.57 14.46 0.00 113.93
Initial return (in per cent) 24.02 16.20 44.26 36.80 450.00








































12.957, respectively). In addition, the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between
these two variables is extremely high (0.9177). Therefore, there is evidence of
multicollinearity. Thus, firm size and offering size variables should be modeled
separately. Table IV shows the results of the logit model using five-year observation
period, based on the data of the first subsample which contains 163 IPO firms. The
description of each variable in Table IV is detailed in Table I. Model 1 in Table IV
includes all variables studied except offering size (OFFERSZ), while Model 2
contains all variables after excluding firm size (FIRMSZ). Models 3 and 4 comprise
only the significant variables in Models 1 and 2. Specifically, Model 3 includes all
significant variables except offering size (OFFERSZ), and Model 4 contains all
significant variables except firm size (FIRMSZ).
There is no evidence of the multicollinearity problem in the four models used in
this study, because the maximum VIF values in the four models illustrated in
Table IV are  10, and the bivariate correlation coefficients between each pair of
variables in these models are  0.80 (Gujarati, 2003). In addition, all logit models
used are accepted based on the likelihood ratio (LR) test, with the p-value being
equal to 0.000 in each model. Furthermore, the logit analysis shows that Model 2 has
the highest pseudo R2 value (0.836), followed by Model 1 (0.827), Model 4 (0.714) and
Model 3 (0.673). Model 2 also has the highest prediction accuracy and C statistics[5].
Models 3 and 4 are restricted (reduced) models developed from their unrestricted
(full) Models 1 and 2, respectively. Thus, a comparison between the unrestricted
model and its restricted model is executed to decide which model is better. This
comparison relies on the LR statistics calculated as “the log-likelihood of the
unrestricted model minus the log-likelihood of the restricted model” (Wooldridge,
2006). It could also be calculated as the chi-square (2) value of the unrestricted
model minus the 2value of the restricted model. Thus, the LR statistics equal 29.21
and 23.067 for Models 1 and 3 and Models 2 and 4, respectively. These two statistics
are greater than the critical value of 25 per cent, 10, which equals 18.307. Therefore, the
unrestricted Models 1 and 2 are preferred to their restricted counterpart Models (i.e.
Models 3 and 4, respectively). As such, only the unrestricted models are highlighted
in the following discussion.
Table IV shows that INSTITUTE, GROWTH, TURNOVER, INITIAL and
ALPHA variables have significant negative relationships with the five-year
delisting rate in Models 1 and 2, based on the Wald test. In addition, FIRMSZ and
OFFERSZ variables included in Models 1 and 2, respectively, have significant
negative relationships with the delisting rate. LEVERAGE variable has the
expected significant positive relationship with the delisting rate in Model 2 at the 10
per cent level. However, FIRMAGE, FRMTYPE, VC, CURRENT, COVERAGE,
ROE, ACTIVITY, QLAUDIT, RULES and SCHEDULE variables are not
significant in either Model 1 or Model 2. The significant variables and their
relationships with the five-year involuntary delisting rate are discussed in the rest of
this section.
A significant negative relationship is reported between firm size (FIRMSZ) and the
probability of involuntary delisting in Model 1 at the 5 per cent level (p-value  0.017)
with a 1.853 beta coefficient. This result supports the resource-based theory. In
addition, there is a significant negative relationship between institutional ownership






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of all coefficients related to this variable. This relationship is significant at the 5 per cent
level in Models 1 and 2 (p-values equal 0.049 and 0.044, respectively). This finding is
consistent with the efficient monitoring hypothesis of Pound (1988).
The coefficient of the LEVERAGE variable is 0.087 in Model 2 with a p-value
equivalent to 0.086. Thus, a significant positive relationship is reported between
leverage and the probability of involuntary delisting at the 10 per cent level. This
result confirms the results of Baker and Kennedy (2002), Li et al. (2006) and Demers
and Joos (2007), among others. It is also in line with the trade-off theory of capital
structure, which argues that high leverage leads to high financial distress.
Furthermore, the results of the assets growth rate (GROWTH) variable are
consistent with the resource-based theory. More specifically, a negative relationship
is reported between the assets growth rate and the delisting rate at the 5 per cent
significance level in Models 1 and 2 (p-values equal 0.021 and 0.028, respectively).
Assets turnover (TURNOVER) is adversely associated with the probability of
involuntary delisting in Models 1 and 2 at the 10 and 5 per cent significance levels,
respectively. This result supports the resource-based theory. It confirms that
survived firms operate their total assets more efficiently compared to other firms.
The increase in the offering size variable (OFFERSZ) also decreases the probability
of involuntary delisting significantly at a 5 per cent level (p-value  0.015) in Model
2. This negative relationship supports the findings of Jain and Kini (1999b), Bhabra
and Pettway (2003) and Kooli and Meknassi (2007), among others. It is also
consistent with the resource-based theory.
The results of the initial returns are consistent with the signaling hypothesis of
Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989), and the
marketing event hypothesis of Chemmanur (1993) and Demers and Lewellen (2003).
Specifically, there is a significant negative relationship between the initial returns
variable (INITIAL) and the probability of involuntary delisting. Furthermore, the
expected negative relationship between insider ownership, measured by ALPHA,
and the probability of delisting involuntarily is confirmed in this study at the 5 per
cent significance level in Models 1 and 2 (p-values equal 0.027 and 0.024,
respectively). This result is in line with the signaling hypothesis of Leland and Pyle
(1977) and Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and the interest convergence theory of
Jensen and Meckling (1976).
The marginal effect illustrated in Table IV shows the effect of a one-unit increase
in the independent variable on the dependent variable (Brooks, 2009). The marginal
effect of the INSTITUTE variable, as a continuous variable, equals  1.7e-06 in
Model 1. This means that the probability of involuntary delisting decreases by
0.00017 per cent with a 1 per cent increase in institutional ownership, all other
factors being constant. In addition, the marginal effect of the VC variable, as a
categorical variable, equals  5.9e-05 in Model 1, meaning that firms backed by VCs
are less subjected to involuntary delisting than non-VC backed firms by 0.0059 per
cent, all other factors being constant. The remaining marginal effects are interpreted
similarly.
5.3 Predicting involuntary delisting status
Based on the results of the four logit regression models shown in Table IV, the








































Models 3 and 4) based on the LR statistics. In addition, Model 2 is preferred to Model 1
based on pseudo R2 value, prediction accuracy and C statistics. In other words, Model 2
is the best model; thus, the logit regression equation of Model 2 is used to predict
involuntary delisting status of the six IPO firms included in the second subsample as
follows[6]:




Pi  1/(1  exp  16.353  0.000 FIRMAGE  0.826 FRMTYPE
 0.058 INSTITUTE  1.837 VC  0.087 LEVERAGE  1.838 CURRENT
 0.191 GROWTH  0.056 COVERAGE  3.671 TURNOVER  0.048 ROE
 1.947 OFFERSZ  6.633 ACTIVITY  0.658 QLAUDIT  0.193 INITIAL
 0.115 ALPHA  3.977 RULES  2.978 SCHEDULE)
The application of the previous equation based on data from the six IPO firms included
in the second subsample of the study shows that the probability of involuntary delisting
(Pi in the six cases is 1 or very close to 1. Because the values of the probability of
involuntary delisting (Pi) are  0.50, the model predicts the involuntary delisting status
of the six IPO firms.
6. Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we examine the determinants of the involuntary delisting rate for a
sample of 163 Egyptian IPOs issued from 1992 to 2004. Based on a definition of
survival time extracted from the Egyptian context, we use the logit regression
analysis to identify the determinants of the five-year involuntary delisting rate. We
report a significant decrease in the probability of involuntary delisting with the
increase in firm size, assets growth rate, operating efficiency, offering size, initial
returns and institutional and insider ownership variables. We also find a significant
positive relationship between financial leverage and involuntary delisting rate.
Based on a model including all these significant variables (except firm size variable),
we correctly predict the involuntary delisting status of the six firms included in the
second subsample, which covers the period 2005-2009. However, the variables of
firm’s age, liquidity, firm type, cash coverage ratio, profitability, IPO activity,
quality of auditor, VC backing and listing rules are not significant in any logit
models used.
Our study confirms the importance of firm characteristics, signaling and offering
variables in predicting the probability of involuntary delisting. The main message
to prospective investors in the IPO firms is to invest in large firms with large
offering size and in firms with low debts, in addition to investing in firms with
high operating efficiency, initial returns, insider and institutional ownership.
Furthermore, issuing firms should defer the decision of going public, until reaching
a reasonable size, and reducing debts in their financial structure. These firms should








































If the IPO firm is of high quality, it should underprice its issue and hold the majority
of shares through insiders.
Regulators of listing rules can also benefit from the findings of this study to
improve their listing rules. This study, for example, suggests that regulators impose
a minimum level of liquidity, cash coverage, assets growth rate, insider ownership
and operating efficiency. They should also impose maximum level of debt ratio on
firms before listing their shares in the EGX. Finally, we suggest that future
researchers replicate this study by using survival time analysis, instead of delisting
rate analysis, to confirm the results of this study.
The analysis undertaken on the hold-out sample has data limitation because it
includes only six firms, which are all delisted firms. We suggest that future research
should include both types of firms, either delisted or non-delisted, as the hold-out
sample. This will enable us to see whether the model can accurately predict the
outcomes with some confidence levels.
Notes
1. “The operating performance ratios can be divided into two subcategories: (1) operating
efficiency ratios and (2) operating profitability ratios. Efficiency ratios examine how the
management uses its assets and capital, measured by dollars of sales generated by
various asset or capital categories. Profitability ratios analyze the profits as a percentage
of sales and as a percentage of the assets and capital employed” (Reilly and Brown, 2006,
p. 315).
2. The earliest involuntary delisting date in this study is on 27 May 2004. Thus, there are no
cases of involuntary delisting before September 2003 in the firms’ samples used in this
study.
3. The probit model is also used to identify the determinants of delisting rate. As expected, the
results of the probit model are similar to those obtained from the logit model. These results are
not included for the sake of brevity; however, they are available upon request from the
authors.
4. We repeated the logit analysis based on a three-year observation period instead of five
years. These analyses are not included for the purpose of brevity. However, they are
available upon request from the authors. We found that all significant variables based on
the three-year analysis, except the listing schedule variable, are also significant based on
the five-year analysis. IPO firms listed on the official schedule have a significantly
smaller delisting rate relative to those listed on the unofficial schedule based only on the
three-year analysis. However, assets turnover and financial leverage variables are found
to be significant in determining the delisting rate based only on the five-year delisting
rate analysis.
5. C statistic is the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. The ROC
curve is a plot that could be used to evaluate the predictive accuracy of the logit model.
The model that has the largest area under the ROC curve is the best model; this model has
the highest sensitivity (i.e. all or most of the delisted firms are accurately predicted) and
the lowest false-positive rate (i.e. no or few survived firms are classified as delisted firms)








































6. The results of the equation based on Model 1 show the same conclusion highlighted by the
equation based on Model 2.
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